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DOES GENDER SPECIFICITY IN 
CONSTITUTIONS MATTER? 
LAURA E. LUCAS* 
INTRODUCTION 
“You’re a woman; why don’t you write the women’s rights section?”1 
With that, 22-year-old interpreter Beate Sirota Gordon, whose only 
experience with constitutions occurred in her high school social studies 
class, was entrusted with drafting the new constitutional provisions that 
would protect Japanese women.2 Her assignment represents a typical 
phenomenon in constitution drafting during that period that has persisted to 
the present—drafters assume that women should be specifically protected3 
but do not see it as a particularly serious, or complicated, element of the 
constitution.4 Of the four provisions related to women that Gordon drafted, 
only one very general provision ended up in the final 1946 Japanese 
Constitution;5 the drafters assumed, too, that the interest in women’s 
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 1. BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM 106 (1997). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. at 104-06 (noting that gender equality was not included as a principle in the MacArthur 
Note, but gender equality was still included as part of the Constitution); see also Alexandra 
Dobrowolsky & Vivien Hart, Introduction: Women, New Politics and Constitutional Change, in 
ALEXANDRA DOBROWOLSKY & VIVIEN HART, WOMEN MAKING CONSTITUTIONS: NEW POLITICS AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 3 (2003) (noting that women’s protection clauses must be included in the 
constitutional text). 
 4. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 1, at 106 (noting that while other constitutional provisions were 
drafted by “specialists” in the field, Gordon, who had no experience in the area, was given the 
responsibility of drafting the women’s rights section). 
 5. Id. at 113-18. The clause that was adopted in the Constitution is article 24, which states: 
“Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through 
mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis. With regard to choice of 
spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to 
marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the 
essential equality of the sexes.” Id. at 125. As adopted, the clause was shortened from Gordon’s original 
draft, which stated: “The family is the basis of human society and its traditions for good or evil 
permeate the nation. Hence marriage and the family are protected by law, and it is hereby ordained that 
they shall rest upon the undisputed legal and social equality of both sexes, upon mutual consent instead 
of parental coercion, and upon cooperation instead of male domination. Laws contrary to these 
principles shall be abolished, and replaced by others viewing choice of spouse, property rights, 
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equality warranted an abstract statement of sex equality but not specific 
guarantees or protections.6 
Women’s protection clauses—defined in this paper as constitutional 
provisions that specifically grant or protect the rights of women7—have 
been considered in nearly every constitution drafted since World War II,8 
but little systemic research has been done to explain what difference the 
clauses make.9 Examining these clauses is important because they may play 
a role in expanding (or perhaps even limiting) women’s equality. This 
paper begins to correct this deficiency by exploring the experiences of two 
countries, Canada and Colombia, to ascertain the importance of these 
clauses and what lessons they provide for future efforts at securing gender 
equality through constitutions.10 
I chose Canada and Colombia as case studies because each country 
adopted a constitutional enforcement mechanism to implement its 
respective women’s protection clauses.11 By including an enforcement 
 
inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce, and other matters pertaining to marriage and family from the 
standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.” Id. at 117. One of Gordon’s 
clauses about education was also adopted in shortened form. Id. at 116. 
 6. Id. at 114-16 (“Your basic point . . . is good, but in general the draft should be more 
concise.”). The committee went on to note that “[c]oncrete measures . . . may be valid, but they’re too 
detailed to put into a constitution. Just write down the principles. The details should be written in the 
statutes. This type of thing is not constitutional material.” Id. at 115. 
 7. See infra Part I.A. 
 8. See Laura Lucas & Taryn Marks, Women and Constitutions Project – Index (2009), http:// 
www.law.duke.edu/capstone/index [hereinafter, Lucas & Marks, Index]. The trend has been to frame 
rights in a gender-specific way (“All men and women are equal”) instead of a neutral way (“All are 
equal”). See id. 
 9. Note, however, that the efficacy of state constitutional gender equality clauses in the United 
States has been evaluated. See Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating 
their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201 (2004). 
Wharton’s evaluation found that the state clauses were effective. Id. at 1204. Other scholars have also 
considered the efficacy of constitutions in promoting change. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE (2d ed. 2008). 
 10. To examine the impact of laws, F.L. Morton and Avril Allen identified two “relevant and 
necessary” studies. F.L. Morton & Avril Allen, Feminists and the Courts: Measuring Success in 
Interest Group Litigation in Canada, 34 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 55, 64 (2001). The first type, an intramural 
study, looks at “what occurs within the confines of litigation and the courthouse.” Id. The second type 
of study, an extramural study, looks past the courtroom and after the judgment to determine the 
“impact” of the study, including “the intermediate-term issue of ‘compliance’ and the longer-term issue 
of ‘real world change.’” Id. Although the importance of the extramural study is not questioned, I focus 
mainly on the intramural examination of women’s protection clauses because of the limited information 
available about extramural legal change. The World Bank’s gender statistics, among the most 
comprehensive and accurate statistics available, contain a limited number of gender statistics that span 
an adequate amount of time to test for change. See World Bank Genderstats, http://go.worldbank.org/ 
YMPEGXASH0 (last visited Apr. 30, 2009) [hereinafter World Bank Data]. 
 11. Canada’s constitutional documents include language that specifically authorizes individuals to 
bring cases. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
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mechanism, a country demonstrates a commitment to comply with the 
constitution beyond that which is demonstrated when a country adopts a 
constitution for purely symbolic reasons. In contrast, the practical legal 
application of laws is necessarily limited under purely symbolic, or 
aspirational, constitutions.12 Because of their constitutions’ enforcement 
mechanisms, Canada and Colombia are “nearly ideal” countries to test for 
the practical legal application of women’s protection clauses.13 
Limiting this study to two countries means that the paper’s findings 
must be viewed cautiously. Still, the study suggests three recurring themes 
that provide some guidance for integrating protections for women into new 
or existing constitutions and help focus a future research agenda with 
respect to women’s protection clauses in other countries. 
First, while women’s protection clauses cannot be shown dispositively 
to be the cause of improved legal protection of women, they seem 
associated with some gains and, in any event, are not connected to a decline 
in women’s rights. Second, many different forms of women’s protection 
clauses exist, each with different potential consequences. Differences exist, 
for example, in how much judicial interpretation is required to give 
meaningful effect to the clause, whether men as well as women have rights 
under the clause, and whether the clause requires litigants to make 
arguments that reinforce sex stereotypes or otherwise cause long-term 
disadvantage to women in order to benefit in the short run. Third, while 
women’s protection clauses may help improve the legal protection of 
women, the case studies demonstrate that the clauses should not be relied 
upon as the exclusive mechanism for promoting the legal protection of 
women. A combination of factors in these two countries contributes to 
women’s legal success, such as enforcement mechanisms, social support 
networks, enabling legislation, and efforts at giving non-privileged parties 
access to the courts. 
 
Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 24(1) (U.K.); see also Charles R. Epp, Do Bill of Rights 
Matter? The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 765, 768-69 (1996). 
Colombia’s tutela system empowers individuals “to seek immediate judicial protection of their 
fundamental constitutional rights.” Martha I. Morgan, Emancipatory Equality: Gender Jurisprudence 
under the Colombian Constitution, in BEVERLEY BAINES & RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, THE GENDER OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 75, 76 (2005) [hereinafter Morgan, Emancipatory Equality]. 
 12. Mauricio García Villegas, Law as Hope: Constitutions, Courts, and Social Change in Latin 
America, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 133 (2004). 
 13. See Epp, supra note 11, at 765, 768 (noting that Canada’s Charter is a good test case for 
determining whether a constitutional document itself brought about change or whether the change 
stemmed from other factors); see Morgan, Emancipatory Equality, supra note 11, at 76 (discussing the 
tutela, a constitutional enforcement mechanism that makes Canada a good test for the practical legal 
application of women’s protection clauses). Although Canada has no single constitution, for simplicity 
this paper refers to the collection of constitutional documents as a constitution. See infra Part II.A. 
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This paper proceeds as follows. First, in Part I, I provide a general 
background of women’s protection clauses in constitutions throughout the 
world. In Part II, I focus more specifically on the historical and legal 
backgrounds in Canada and Colombia. Finally, in Parts III, IV, and V, I 
discuss in turn each of the three lessons suggested from the experiences of 
Canada and Colombia that might be useful to constitution-drafters and 
other individuals who seek to advance gender equality through 
constitutions or constitutional amendments. I also show how these lessons 
might define a future research agenda in the field of constitutional women’s 
protection clauses. 
I. BACKGROUND ON WOMEN’S PROTECTION CLAUSES 
Women’s protection clauses, while incorporated in recent decades into 
virtually all new constitutions, are a relatively recent phenomenon in 
constitutional design. This section explores the history of women’s 
protection clauses. It also considers the question of how we might measure 
the beneficial effects of these clauses, including what counts as progress 
with respect to women’s rights. Furthermore, this section explores whether 
constitutions ever have the power to promote social change. 
A. History of Women’s Protection Clauses 
When the world’s first constitutions were developed, constitutional 
framers gave little consideration to the idea of a women’s protection 
clause.14 People generally assumed that women served different roles than 
men and were not their political equals.15 As the concept of women’s 
equality gained strength, constitutional designers increasingly included 
constitutional provisions that recognized and attempted to ensure women’s 
rights.16 
Since 1945, almost every constitution or constitutional revision has 
included a women’s protection clause.17 These clauses fall into five basic 
categories.18 The first category consists of general equality clauses that 
 
 14. See HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 16 (2008) (noting that drafters did not consider women’s 
issues during the development of the U.S. Constitution). 
 15. See Elizabeth Reitz Mullenix, Private Women/Public Acts: Petticoat Government and the 
Performance of Resistance, 46 DRAMA REV. 104, 105 (2002). 
 16. See Georgia Waylen, Constitutional Engineering: What Opportunities For The Enhancement 
Of Gender Rights?, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 1209, 1209 (2006). 
 17. See Lucas & Marks, Index, supra note 8. 
 18. Laura Lucas & Taryn Marks, Women and Constitutions Project – Data by Category (2009), 
http://www.law.duke.edu/capstone/category.html [hereinafter, Lucas & Marks, Category]. 
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make open-ended promises of equality for women.19 These clauses 
generally mandate equal treatment for men and women without specifying 
equality in a particular area.20 For example, article 22 of the Constitution of 
Afghanistan mandates that “[t]he citizens of Afghanistan, man and woman, 
have equal rights and duties before the law.”21 
A second type of women’s protection clause defines particular 
political guarantees for women, including suffrage, quotas in government 
offices, citizenship, and royal descent.22 As an example, article 19 of the 
Constitution of the Central African Republic guarantees to “[a]ll Central 
Africans of both sexes who are over 18 years of age and enjoy their civil 
and political rights . . . the right to vote in elections within the conditions 
determined by law.”23 
A third type of women’s protection clause makes various social 
guarantees with respect to matters such as education, motherhood, and 
domestic violence.24 Article 44(1) of the Sudanese Constitution is an 
example of a social clause; it mandates that “[e]ducation is a right for every 
citizen and the State shall provide access to education without 
discrimination as to . . . gender . . . .”25 
A fourth type of women’s protection clause guarantees women various 
economic freedoms, such as equality in the workplace.26 For example, 
article 35(8) of the Ethiopian Constitution guarantees that “[w]omen shall 
have a right to equality in employment, promotion, pay, and the transfer of 
pension entitlements.”27 
Finally, the fifth type provides for affirmative action, supplying 
women with special protections, privileges, or job advantages.28 As an 
example of an affirmative action clause, article 116(2) of the Greek 
Constitution states: “Adoption of positive measures for promoting equality 
between men and women does not constitute discrimination on the basis of 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REP. OF AFG. art. 22, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search 
using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 22. See Lucas & Marks, Category, supra note 18. 
 23. CONST. OF THE CENT. AFR. REP. art. 19, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search using 
“Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 24. Lucas & Marks, Category, supra note 18. Other miscellaneous types of social clauses are also 
adopted occasionally in constitutions. Id. 
 25. INTERIM NAT’L CONST. OF THE REP. OF THE SUDAN art. 44(1), available at http:// 
www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 26. Lucas & Marks, Category, supra note 18. 
 27. FED. NEGARIT GAZETA OF THE FED. DEM. REP. OF ETH. art. 35(8), available at http:// 
www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 28. Lucas & Marks, Category, supra note 18. 
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sex. The State shall attend to the elimination of inequalities actually 
existing, especially to the detriment of women.”29 
All five main categories of clauses can be found in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) and the Colombian 
Constitution.30 The Charter includes two general equality clauses31 and an 
affirmative action clause.32 The Colombian Constitution contains two 
general equality clauses,33 one political clause,34 two social clauses,35 and 
an economic clause.36 
B. Constitutions and Social Change 
Constitutions are limited in their ability to create meaningful social 
change. Change is facilitated when the citizens of the country internally 
desires to mobilize the law and the government has sufficient power and 
resources to enforce the new law.37 Without this background support, 
women’s protection clauses in constitutions may become “empty 
promises.”38 For example, scholars have noted that in Canada, “in the 
absence of adequate resources for legal mobilization, few noneconomic 
cases are likely to reach the judicial agenda”; without these resources, 
many rights-based cases involving women’s protection clauses would not 
be adjudicated.39 In this way, women’s protection clauses may “matter, but 
only if civil societies have the capacity to support and develop them.”40 
Because of the interaction of new constitutional protections with 
institutional commitments and resources, it is difficult to tease out their 
impact—sometimes a change in the circumstances of women may follow 
 
 29. 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN] [Constitution] art. 116(2) (Greece), available at http:// 
www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 30. See generally Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.); POLITICAL CONST. OF COLOM., available at 
http://www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” 
database). 
 31. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, §§ 15(1), 28 (U.K.). 
 32. Id. § 15(2). The Constitution Act of 1982 also contains a women’s protection clause (separate 
from the Charter) in section 35(4), a social clause that guarantees aboriginal women equal rights. Id. 
Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 35(4). 
 33. POLITICAL CONST. OF COLOM. arts. 13, 43, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search 
using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 34. Id. art. 96. 
 35. Id. arts. 42, 43. 
 36. Id. art. 53. 
 37. Epp, supra note 11, at 766. 
 38. See id. at 777. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
LUCAS_CPCXNS.DOC 12/4/2009  2:48:09 PM 
2009] DOES GENDER SPECIFICITY IN CONSTITUTIONS MATTER 139 
constitutional reform but may in actuality stem from other, non-
constitutional factors. For example, in a regime change, the new 
government may promulgate a new constitution, but any subsequent 
improvements in the condition of women actually could be a result of the 
new regime’s perspective on women rather than of the text of the 
constitution.41 Thus, while this paper draws associations between 
constitutional reforms and the social, economic, and political circumstances 
of women’s lives, it makes no causal claims. In this sense, it is meant to be 
suggestive, rather than authoritative, about best practices for women’s 
protection clauses. 
C. Underlying Assumptions 
Use of the term “women’s protection clause” itself represents a 
commitment to a particular vision of women’s rights. The assumption of 
this paper is that what matters is not abstract, formal equality between men 
and women but rather concrete protections that speak to, and seek to 
improve, the actual circumstances of women’s lives. In general, I use a 
substantive standard of equality that addresses the outcome and results of 
laws and policies.42 Thus, in evaluating how various constitutional 
provisions have “worked” or “succeeded,” I count any movement that 
increased legal protection for women as a success. For example, while a 
court case would not be successful if the judiciary struck a law that 
guaranteed maternity leave for pregnant women, I would classify the case 
as successful if the court gave mothers increased protection in the 
workplace. There is the possibility, of course, that increased legal 
protection might become so paternalistic as to trade women’s long-term 
welfare away in exchange for only a short-term gain.43 Yet none of the 
court cases or clauses considered in this study seemed to make this trade-
off. 
 
 41. See id. at 765. 
 42. See Savitri W. E. Goonesekere, The Concept of Substantive Equality and Gender Justice in 
South Asia, U.N. DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR WOMEN 9-10 (2007), 
http://www.unifem.org.in/PDF/The%20Concept%20of%20Substantive%20Equality%20-final%20-
%2031-12-07.pdf (explaining the concept of substantive equality). 
 43. For example, instead of simply guaranteeing special protection for mothers in the same way 
that many constitutions do, article 47(2) of the Bulgarian Constitution states that “[m]others enjoy 
special protection of the state which provides them with . . . easier work . . . .” CONST. OF THE REP. OF 
BULG. art. 47(2), available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries 
of the World Online” database). By assuming that pregnant women can only perform “easier work,” the 
Bulgarian Constitution can be interpreted as setting forth a paternalistic and limited view on the abilities 
of women. 
LUCAS_CPCXNS.DOC 12/4/2009  2:48:09 PM 
140 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:133 
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL INFORMATION ON CONSTITUTIONS 
OF CANADA & COLOMBIA 
The women’s protection clauses of Canada and Colombia emerged 
from different historical and legal backgrounds. For example, in Canada, 
the clauses resulted from an amendment to a preexisting constitution.44 In 
contrast, Colombia adopted its women’s protection clauses simultaneously 
with a new constitutional regime.45 This section examines this difference 
and other important differences in the historical and legal backgrounds of 
the Canadian and Colombian constitutions. 
A. Canada 
Canada’s initial 1867 Constitution contained no promises of women’s 
equality.46 After the Canadian Supreme Court decided several “landmark” 
civil liberty cases that restricted civil rights, the Diefenbaker government 
adopted a statutory Bill of Rights in 1960.47 However, the document was 
largely ignored because of its statutory nature.48 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, justice minister Pierre Trudeau49 
proposed a constitutional bill of rights in an attempt to provide protection 
to Canadian English speakers (who could not read the French laws in 
Quebec) and to “encourag[e] the development of rights-based cleavages 
that would unite some Canadians across provincial boundaries.”50 Although 
women’s rights were not the catalyst for this constitutional reform project, 
Canadian women participated in the negotiation of this amendment and 
managed to negotiate some provisions that extended their legal rights.51 
After much “complicated political maneuvering,” the act was passed in 
1982 as part of a larger set of reforms contained in the Constitution Act of 
1982.52 Upon its adoption, the Constitution Act and its protections for 
 
 44. LYNN SMITH & ELEANOR WACHTEL, A FEMINIST GUIDE TO THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION: A 
BACKGROUND PAPER COMMISSION BY THE CANADIAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF 
WOMEN 11-12 (1992). 
 45. Martha I. Morgan, Taking Machismo to Court: The Gender Jurisprudence of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 253, 257 (1998) [hereinafter Morgan, 
Machismo]. 
 46. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 
1985). 
 47. Epp, supra note 11, at 768. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Trudeau later became the prime minister of Canada. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See IRVING, supra note 14, at 16. 
 52. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.); Epp, supra note 11, at 768; SMITH & WACHTEL, supra note 
44, at 28-41. 
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women became “entrenched” in the Canadian Constitution, meaning that 
the Act can be changed only through the use of a “special constitutional 
amendment.”53 
The Constitution Act of 1982 included several law reforms, a few of 
which are of special relevance to women. Most importantly, the reforms 
entrenched the Charter into a constitutional document.54 The Charter 
contains several women’s protection clauses. First, section 28 guarantees 
that all the rights mentioned in the Charter apply “equally to male and 
female persons.”55 Second, section 15(1) of the Charter explicitly mandates 
the equality of men and women.56 The Charter also notes in section 15(2) 
that affirmative action programs designed to ameliorate past sex 
discrimination do not violate the Charter.57 Section 15 came into effect on 
April 17, 1985, in order to give governments time to align with the new 
rights accorded by the section.58 
While the Charter grants broad rights, they are limited by section 1, 
which mandates that the rights in the Charter are “subject to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.”59 The section 1 limitation is consistent with 
the international human rights model of setting out rights.60 
 
 53. See SMITH & WACHTEL, supra note 44, at 11-12. The Canadian Constitution consists of 
several constitutional documents, including: (1) the Canada Act of 1982, which enacted the Constitution 
Act of 1982 (which includes the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms); (2) the Constitution Act of 
1867; (3) several laws that “admit[] provinces or territories to Confederation or altering boundaries”; 
and (4) the Statute of Westminister 1931. Id. 
 54. Id. at 29. 
 55. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 28 (U.K.) (“Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights 
and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.”). 
 56. Id. § 15(1) (“Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination 
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”). 
 57. Id. § 15(2) (“Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical 
disability.”). 
 58. HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, AN OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOMS (2006), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/pdp-hrp/canada/guide/ov-apr-eng.cfm. 
 59. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 1 (U.K.). 
 60. ROBERT J. SHARPE & KENT ROACH, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 46 (3d ed. 
2005) (noting that international human rights documents “expressly acknowledge that rights can be 
limited to protect other individual rights or broader community interests”). See, e.g., International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(“Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he 
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant . . . .”). 
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In addition to memorializing the Charter as a constitutional document, 
the Constitution Act of 1982 also specifically protects aboriginal women in 
section 35(4), which notes that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are 
guaranteed equally to male and female persons.”61 
Two final judicial policies also impact the potential success of the 
women’s protection clauses. First, the Charter includes language that 
specifically authorizes individuals to bring cases under the Charter.62 
Second, courts in Canada have a policy of deciding cases on non-
constitutional grounds if at all possible.63 
B. Colombia 
The 1886 Colombian Constitution—the oldest operating constitution 
in Latin America64—”lacked many of the fundamental rights common in 
contemporary constitutions.”65 The Constitution of 1886 did not include 
any gender-based discrimination prohibitions66 or express any equality 
provisions.67 
Colombian students initiated a campaign in 1991 to create a new 
constitution.68 A team of young lawyers drafted a detailed and organized 
draft, and, after five months of debate, Colombia adopted a new 
Constitution in July of 1991.69 
The 1991 Constitution organizes Colombia into an estado social de 
derecho, a “concept . . . [that] unit[es] the rule of law with a social state 
and . . . represent[s] a middle ground between liberal and socialist notions 
of the state.”70 The new constitution contains negative and positive rights 
 
 61. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 35(4) (U.K.). 
 62. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 24(1) (U.K.); see also Epp, supra note 11, at 768-69. 
 63. Robert J. Sharpe, Mootness, Abstract Questions and Alternative Grounds: Deciding Whether 
to Decide, in CHARTER LITIGATION 327, 343-45 (Robert J. Sharpe ed., 1986) [hereinafter Sharpe, 
Mootness]. 
 64. Morgan, Emancipatory Equality, supra note 11, at 75. 
 65. Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 258. 
 66. Martha I. Morgan, Constitution-Making in a Time of Cholera: Women and the 1991 
Colombian Constitution, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 353, 380 (1992) [hereinafter Morgan, Constitution-
Making]. 
 67. Morgan, Emancipatory Equality, supra note 11, at 75. 
 68. Morgan, Constitution-Making, supra note 66, at 365. 
 69. Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 257 & n.11. 
 70. Id. at 258 & n.15 (citing Manuel José Cepeda, Democracy, State, and Society in the 1991 
Constitution: The Role of the Constitutional Court, in COLOMBIA: THE POLITICS OF REFORMING THE 
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that extend to “civil, political, social, economic, cultural, and collective 
rights.”71 
The Colombian Constitution grants a broad array of rights to women 
through the use of seven women’s protection clauses—articles 13 
(equality), 40 (political participation), 42 (women’s status in the family), 43 
(equal rights, non-discrimination, protection of pregnant women, and 
special support to female heads of households), 53 (workplace protection 
for women and mothers), 96 (citizenship based on mothers), and 323 
(women as alderwomen).72 
The Colombian Constitution so extensively protects women that it 
includes multiple enumerations of the same right. The constitution 
guarantees equality for women three times. First, article 13 guarantees 
equal “rights, freedoms, and opportunities” to all individuals regardless of 
gender.73 Then, article 43 grants “equal rights and opportunities” to 
women.74 Finally, article 43 bans “any type of discrimination” against 
women.75 
The Constitution also specifically protects women in their political, 
family, and work lives. Article 40 requires state authorities to “guarantee 
the adequate and effective participation of women in the decision-making 
ranks of the public administration.”76 Women also enjoy “special 
 
STATE 71, 86 (Eduardo Posada-Carbó ed., 1998)) (describing estado social de derecho as defined by an 
advisor to the constitution-making process). 
 71. Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 258. 
 72. POLITICAL CONST. OF COLOM. arts. 13, 40, 42, 43, 53, 96, 323, available at 
http://www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” 
database). 
 73. Id. art. 13 (“All individuals are born free and equal before the law, will receive equal 
protection and treatment from the authorities, and will enjoy the same rights, freedoms, and 
opportunities without any discrimination on account of gender, race, national or family origin, 
language, religion, political opinion, or philosophy. The State will promote the conditions so that 
equality may be real and effective and will adopt measures in favor of groups that are discriminated 
against or marginalized. The State will especially protect those individuals who on account of their 
economic, physical, or mental condition are in obviously vulnerable circumstances and will sanction the 
abuses or ill-treatment perpetrated against them.”). 
 74. Id. art. 43 (“Women and men have equal rights and opportunities. Women cannot be subjected 
to any type of discrimination. During their periods of pregnancy and following delivery, women will 
benefit from the special assistance and protection of the State and will receive from the latter food 
subsidies if they should thereafter find themselves unemployed or abandoned.”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. art. 40 (“Any citizen has the right to participate in the establishment, exercise, and control 
of political power. To make this decree effective the citizen may: 1. Vote and be elected. 2. Participate 
in elections, plebiscites, referendums, popular consultations, and other forms of democratic 
participation. 3. Constitute parties, political movements, or groups without any limit whatsoever; freely 
participate in them and diffuse their ideas and programs. 4. Revoke the mandate of those elected in 
cases where it applies and in the form provided for by the Constitution and the law. 5. Take initiatives 
in public bodies. 6. Undertake public measures in defense of the Constitution and the law. 7. Agree to 
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protection” in the workplace as guaranteed by article 53.77 Finally, the 
Constitution protects women’s family lives in article 43, which guarantees 
“special assistance and protection of the State” for pregnant women78 and 
requires the state to “support the female head of household.”79 Article 53 
guarantees “special protection” for mothers in the workplace.80 
Although many of the previous Colombian constitutions were 
aspirational, the drafters created a new Constitutional Court with 
enforcement duties “[t]o ensure that these broad new protections did not 
remain merely ‘paper guarantees.’”81 The Constitution gave the Court 
broad judicial review powers, including review over legislation, 
international treaties, and public actions.82 
An important aspect of the new Constitution is the tutela, which 
empowers individuals “to seek immediate judicial protection of their 
fundamental constitutional rights.”83 Individuals may file a tutela with any 
justice, and a ruling must be made within ten days.84 Following the ruling, 
offenders must comply with any implementing decrees within forty-eight 
hours.85 All tutelas are sent to the Constitutional Court for discretionary 
review by the Court.86 Tutela rulings formally apply only to the parties, 
 
undertake public functions and responsibilities, except for those Colombian citizens, native-born or 
naturalized, who hold dual citizenship. The law will spell out this exception and will determine the 
cases where they apply. The authorities will guarantee the adequate and effective participation of 
women in the decision-making ranks of the public administration.”). 
 77. Id. art. 53 (“The Congress will issue a labor statute. The appropriate law will take into account 
at least the following minimal fundamental principles: Equality of opportunity for workers; minimum 
essential and flexible remuneration proportional to the amount and quality of work; stability in 
employment; irrevocability of minimum benefits established in labor regulations; options to negotiate 
about and reconcile uncertain and arguable rights; a situation more favorable to the worker in case of 
doubt in the application and interpretation of the formal bases of the law; the primacy of facts over 
established formalities in issues of labor relations; guarantees to social security, training, instruction, 
and necessary rest; special protection of women, mothers, and minor-age workers. The State guarantees 
the right of suitable payment and the periodic adjustment of legal retirement benefits. International 
labor agreements duly ratified are part of domestic legislation. The law, contracts, agreements, and 
labor settlements may not infringe on the freedom, human dignity, or rights of workers.”). 
 78. Id. art. 43. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. art. 53. 
 81. Morgan, Emancipatory Equality, supra note 11, at 76 (noting that the constitutional court has 
the power to enforce the supremacy of the constitution). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 276. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 277. 
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which is a feature consistent with the Colombian Constitution’s civil 
nature.87 
The “modern” new Constitution created “bold expectations,”88 but 
many scholars had lingering concerns about how successful the document 
would be in practice.89 Like many of the previous Colombian Constitutions, 
there was a fear that the 1991 Constitution would not be enforced and a 
“wide gulf . . . between the law in books and the law in action” would 
continue to exist with respect to the new women’s protection clauses.90 
III. LESSON NO. 1: CONSTITUTION-MAKERS SHOULD CONTINUE 
TO INCLUDE WOMEN’S PROTECTION CLAUSES 
An extensive look at the women’s protection clauses in Canada and 
Colombia reveals three important lessons. In this section I discuss the first 
lesson—that constitution-drafters should continue to include women’s 
protection clauses. I demonstrate that courts frequently use women’s 
protection clauses to legally protect women, but even in the absence of 
positive legal advancement, decreased legal protection does not result. As I 
show, the legal protection of women in both Canada and Colombia appears 
to have improved since the adoption of women’s protection clauses. 
A. Canada 
Prior to the adoption of the women’s protection clauses, feminist 
litigants lost every case they brought.91 Since the Charter’s adoption, 
women in Canada have experienced increased protection.92 
 
 87. See id. at 280. 
 88. Morgan, Emancipatory Equality, supra note 11, at 75. 
 89. See, e.g., Morgan, Constitution-Making, supra note 66, at 405. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 71-72 (citing reviews by Sylvia Bashevkin and William 
Bogart that both report five feminist litigation cases and five losses). 
 92. For a discussion of what constitutes a possible increase in protection, see Part I.C. 
Increases in the extramural protection of women in Canada may also have occurred, although it is 
impossible to ascertain the direct cause of this improvement. The World Bank’s gender statistics, 
among the most comprehensive and accurate statistics available, contain a limited number of gender 
statistics that span a long enough period to test for change. See World Bank Data, supra note 10. For 
that reason, my examination of Canada’s gender consequences includes only a look at the labor force 
participation rate for women. 
  Data indicates that the women’s protection clauses in Canada are correlated with positive 
improvement in the rate of female participation in the labor force. See id. Since the adoption of its 
women’s protection clauses, Canada improved its female labor force participation rate. See id. Prior to 
the adoption of the women’s protection clauses in 1982 (and 1985, since section 15 did not come into 
force until this date), 59 percent of women participated in the labor force. Id. Since adoption, women 
have slowly gained a higher rate of participation, with an average improvement of 0.6 percentage points 
per year. Id. 
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One example of the increased protection is pregnancy.93 Prior to the 
adoption of the women’s protection clauses, the Supreme Court of Canada 
decided, in Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada, that pregnancy 
discrimination did not constitute sex discrimination.94 In Bliss, a woman 
brought a suit based on an insurance law that differentiated between 
pregnancy claims and other regular or disability-based claims.95 The Court 
upheld the law, holding that “any inequality between the sexes in this area 
is not created by legislation but by nature.”96 However, since the adoption 
of Canada’s women’s protection clauses, cases have extended the 
protection of women, finding that pregnancy discrimination is a form of 
unlawful sex discrimination.97 The Court has extended protection in other 
areas as well, such as abortion98 and sexual assault.99 
 
  The latest figures, from 2006, showed participation of 73.2 percent of females. Id. The rate of 
improvement may be connected to proximity to the date of the women’s protection clauses’ adoption. 
In the first ten years following the adoption of the clauses, the rate of labor force participation improved 
the most, with an average of 1.0 percent improvement each year. See id. The next ten years the rate 
improved by an average of 0.2 percent each year, with some years netting a loss on participation. See id. 
This data suggests that increased female participation in the labor force may be connected to the amount 
of time that has passed since the adoption of the clause. 
  This information indicates that women’s protection clauses may have played a role in the 
increased participation of women in the workforce. Although more information is needed to ascertain 
whether the improvement is part of a bigger trend, women’s protection clauses are correlated with 
positive change in this area. In addition, since the rates of improvement weakened as time passed from 
the adoption of the clauses, the data suggests that the improvements may be correlated to the adoption 
of the clauses. 
 93. I make no attempt to argue what the proper scope of maternity protection should be. Instead, I 
argue simply that prior to the adoption of the women’s protection clauses, the Supreme Court of Canada 
changed its view on pregnancy in a way that arguably expands women’s protection under the law. 
 94. Bliss v. Attorney Gen. of Can., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (Can.). 
 95. Id.; see also CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, FEMINIST ACTIVISM IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
LEGAL MOBILIZATION AND THE WOMEN’S LEGAL EDUCATION AND ACTION FUND, at xiii (2005). 
 96. Bliss, 1 S.C.R. at 184; see also MANFREDI, supra note 95, at xiii. 
 97. See, e.g., Brooks v. Can. Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (Can.) (departing from the Court’s 
policy in Bliss of ignoring the impact or pregnancy on the equality of women and holding that pregnancy 
discrimination is unlawful sex discrimination). In Brooks, the Court did not explicitly note that sections 15 
and 28 of the Charter led to the decision. See id. Instead, the Court considered the Manitoba Human 
Rights Act. Id. However, the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (“LEAF”) argued for the 
Manitoba Act to be interpreted consistently with sections 15 and 28, so it may be assumed that the 
Court considered these gender provisions. See WOMEN’S LEGAL EDUC. AND ACTION FUND, EQUALITY 
AND THE CHARTER: TEN YEARS OF FEMINIST ADVOCACY BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 73 
(1996). 
 98. See, e.g., R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.) (striking a law that prohibited abortions 
outside of hospitals). 
 99. See, e.g., Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 (Can.) (holding that a male doctor sexually 
assaulted his female patient when he offered her a sex-for-drugs arrangement); R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 
S.C.R. 63 (Can.) (holding a man guilty for sexual assault against a woman despite his being 
intoxicated). 
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Few cases explicitly cite to constitutional violations of women’s 
protection clauses because of the judiciary’s policy of avoiding 
constitutional grounds in its decisions;100 instead, the women’s protection 
clauses usually influence judges as a background factor as part of the legal 
culture without being mentioned in the text of the decision. For example, 
even though section 28 (equal application of Charter rights “to male and 
female persons”)101 is infrequently referred to in Charter cases, scholars 
argue that “its spirit has influenced the approach taken by the Court in 
some cases. . . .”102 These scholars contend that section 28 led the Court in 
R. v. Morgentaler to strike a rule that prohibited abortions outside of 
hospitals, yet the Court did not discuss section 28 in its opinion.103 
Similarly, there is evidence that the Court generally considers the clauses 
even when the Court does not explicitly mention the clauses in the text of 
the decisions. In particular, briefs filed before the Court by the Women’s 
Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF)—a strategic litigation group—
regularly point out the relevant women’s protection clauses to the Court.104 
As these cases demonstrate, women have enjoyed increased protection 
under the law since the adoption of women’s protection clauses in Canada. 
Yet, it is impossible to say with certainty whether this increased protection 
is due to the women’s protection clauses or some other factor. At a 
minimum, these cases demonstrate that women’s legal protection has not 
decreased in Canada since the adoption of the women’s protection clauses. 
B. Colombia 
Traditionally, Colombian women have not been protected strongly by 
constitutional law.105 Instead, machismo and the prevalent conservative 
Catholic views of Colombian society marginalized women.106 Now, 
 
 100. See Sharpe, Mootness, supra note 63, at 343-44. 
 101. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 28 (U.K.). 
 102. C. Lynn Smith, Adding a Third Dimension: The Canadian Approach to Constitutional 
Equality Guarantees, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 229 (1992). 
 103. Id. (discussing R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.)). 
 104. See WOMEN’S LEGAL EDUC. & ACTION FUND, supra note 97, at 69-85 (discussing LEAF’s 
argument that a women’s protection clause applied in Brooks v. Can. Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
1219 (Can.); Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.F. 226 (Can.); Weatherall v. Can. (Attorney Gen.), [1993] 2 
S.C.R. 872 (Can.); R. v. M.L.M., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 
(Can.)). 
 105. Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 256. 
 106. Id. 
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however, Colombia’s women’s protection clauses protect women more 
expansively than in the past, especially in the private sphere.107 
Since the adoption of the women’s protection clauses, women have 
received the protection they were seeking in the majority of worthy suits 
brought to the court.108 For example, in Sentencia No. C-470/97, the Court 
used several women’s protection clauses—including articles 13, 43, and 
53109—to justify its decision that pregnant women should be protected in 
 
 107. Women’s protection clauses were applied to the private sphere through the use of the tutela. 
See supra Part II.B. 
  Women’s protection clauses also appear to be correlated with improvements in the extramural 
protection of women. The women’s protection clauses in Colombia also seem to be correlated with 
positive changes in gender equality data. My extramural study was necessarily limited because the 
World Bank’s gender statistics, among the most comprehensive and accurate statistics, contain a limited 
number of gender statistics that span a long enough period to test for change. See World Bank Data, 
supra note 10. The female labor force participation rate and the primary completion rate of females 
have both steadily improved since the adoption of the women’s protection clauses. See id. However, 
data suggests that some of these improvements might be part of a trend that began prior to the adoption 
of the clauses. 
  First, Colombia’s female labor force participation rate has undergone steady improvement 
since the adoption of its women’s protection clauses. See id. In 1990, a year prior to the adoption of the 
clauses, 47.6 percent of females participated in the labor force. Id. After the adoption of the women’s 
protection clauses, the rate jumped nearly 4 percent, to 51.4 percent. Id. Since then, the steady 
improvement has continued, ending up at 68.6 percent in 2006. Id. All in all, the female labor force 
participation improved 21 percentage points since the adoption of the clause, an average of 1.3 
percentage points per year. See id. While the improvement in the labor force participation rate is 
remarkable, it pales in comparison to the growth in female labor participation that the country had 
experienced prior to adopting the clause. In 1980, eleven years prior to the adoption of the clauses, 38.2 
percent of females participated in the labor force. Id. The participation rate improved approximately 2.8 
percentage points each year until the women’s protection clause was adopted. See id. This demonstrates 
that improvements in the female participation rate are likely part of a trend that developed prior to the 
adoption of the women’s protection clause. Because of the ongoing trend in Colombia, women’s 
protection clauses should probably not be given sole credit for the improvements in the rate of labor 
force participation. 
  Second, since the adoption of women’s protection clauses, the primary completion rate of 
females has grown 33.7 percentage points. See id. The year prior to the adoption of the clauses, 1991, 
had a primary completion rate of 73.3 percent. Id. Since the adoption, the rate has improved yearly by 
an average of 2.1 percentage points. See id. The World Bank’s data on primary completion rate begins 
in 1990, so no information is available regarding rather a preexisting trend of improvement existed. 
However, this data suggests that women’s protection clauses are correlated with positive changes in the 
primary completion rate of females. Since the female labor participation rate and the primary 
completion rate of females have both improved since 1991, the data suggests that Colombia’s women’s 
protection clauses are correlated with positive changes in equality. These improvements, however, may 
be part of an ongoing preexisting trend. 
 108. On occasion, the Colombian Constitutional Court has ignored relevant women’s protection 
clauses. See, e.g., Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia C-152/94 
(upholding a discriminatory law that mandated that men’s surnames must be listed prior to women’s 
surnames on birth registries despite article 13’s prohibition against sex discrimination). 
 109. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia C-470/97. 
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the workplace.110 The Court also used a women’s protection clause to find 
for a woman in Sentencia No. T-098/94.111 In that case, the Court used 
article 13 (equal “rights, freedoms, and opportunities” to individuals of 
both genders)112 to strike a social security policy that provided benefits for 
the “wives or permanent companions” of male employees but did not 
provide the benefits for female employees.113 Similarly, the Court used a 
women’s protection clause to justify its decision in Sentencia No. T-
414/93.114 There, the Court used article 43 (“[t]he state shall support the 
woman head of family in a special manner”),115 along with articles that deal 
with due process and labor rights, to protect a widow whose family 
blacksmith shop had been closed down by municipal authorities.116 The 
Court also used women’s protection clauses in Sentencia No. T-222/93 to 
strike a prison regulation that required female prisoners to get an intra-
uterine device or take contraceptives before they could go on conjugal 
visits.117 Because male prisoners were not subject to similar requirements, 
the Constitutional Court found the regulation unconstitutional, holding that 
the case violated article 13 (non-discrimination on ground of sex), article 
43 (special protection and assistance to women during pregnancy), and 
three gender-neutral constitutional clauses.118 
 
 110. Id.; see also Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 286 (noting that the Court held that 
“women workers cannot be dismissed from their jobs without cause during pregnancy or within the first 
three months after giving birth and that employers who unlawfully terminate an employee during these 
periods are not only obligated to pay the employee sixty days’ salary as provided in . . . the labor code 
but also must reinstate all employment rights”). 
 111. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia T-098/94; see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 309. 
 112. POLITICAL CONST. OF COLOM. art. 13, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search using 
“Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 113. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia T-098/94; see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 309 (noting that the judge looked to the traditional machismo 
society in Colombia and said that “‘[t]he historical vision of woman’s role must not affect . . . the 
recognition of benefits that have the effect of increasing her income as a pensioner’”). 
 114. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia T-414/93; see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 303. 
 115. POLITICAL CONST. OF COLOM. art. 43, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search using 
“Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 116. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia T-414/93; see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 303. 
 117. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia T-222/93; see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 288. 
 118. POLITICAL. CONST. OF COLOM. arts. 13, 43, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search 
using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database); Corte Constitucional de 
Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia T-222/93; see also Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 
288-89. The applicable neutral clauses were articles 16, 42, and 83 of the Colombian Constitution. 
Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia T-222/93; see also Morgan, 
Machismo, supra note 45, at 288-89. Article 16 provides that “[a]ll individuals are entitled to the 
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As these cases demonstrate, women receive more legal protection now 
that Colombia has adopted women’s protection clauses. Still, it is difficult 
to determine the extent to which the improved legal status of women is a 
result of the women’s protection clauses because the impact of the clauses 
is intertwined with the impact of the tutela.119 The increased substantive 
provisions along with the enforcement system, however, have led to 
increased legal protection. 
IV. LESSON NO. 2: CONSTITUTION-MAKERS SHOULD 
CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE FORMAT OF WOMEN’S 
PROTECTION CLAUSES 
This section discusses the second lesson apparent from the case 
studies—that there are potential differences in the scope and format of 
women’s protection clauses and that drafters must choose from the various 
options. Drafters should consider the extent to which the clause: (1) 
requires judicial interpretation, (2) may be applied to men, and (3) may 
require litigants to make arguments that are in their short-term, but not their 
long-term, interests in terms of sex equality. Valid reasons exist to format 
women’s protection clauses in various ways; I merely suggest that these 
differences be considered deliberately, with a view toward the priorities of 
the drafters. 
A. Consideration No. 1: Does the Clause Produce Easy-to-Administer 
Standards or is Judicial Interpretation Required? 
When drafting a women’s protection clause for a new constitution or 
amendment, one of the factors for drafters to consider is whether the clause 
produces easy-to-administer standards or whether substantial judicial 
interpretation will be required. Of these two formatting options, one is not 
necessarily preferable to the other. Constitution-makers should consider the 
current status of women’s equality in the country, along with the country’s 
 
unrestricted development of their identity without limitations other than those imposed by the rights of 
others and the legal order,” article 42 provides that “[t]he couple has the right to decide freely and 
responsibly the number of their children,” and article 83 provides that “[t]he activities of individuals 
and of public authorities will have to be performed in good faith, which will be presumed in all the 
measures that the former promote vis-à-vis the latter.” POLITICAL. CONST. OF COLOM. arts. 16, 42, 83, 
available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World 
Online” database). 
 119. See Morgan, Emancipatory Equality, supra note 11, at 76 (noting that scholars believe that 
“[tutelas] have been particularly critical to the success of the pioneering efforts at social change through 
litigation under the new Constitution.”); Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 311-23 (discussing the 
impact of the tutela on women’s protection). 
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faith in its judiciary, when deciding which format of women’s protection 
clause will best serve the nation. 
On one hand, easy-to-administer standards provide legal certainty and 
bind legal professionals (in this case, law-makers who make legislation to 
comply with the laws and the judiciary that serves as a law-enforcer) to 
defined standards of equality. This may be preferable if the law is quite 
progressive and/or if constitution-makers do not trust the judiciary to 
interpret the clauses in ways that protect women. If the judiciary cannot be 
trusted, it may be inadvisable to rely on the judiciary to interpret the 
women’s protection clauses, since the policy preferences of judges 
necessarily influence the scope of gender rights granted.120 
Clauses with explicitly stated standards are subject to two potential 
downsides. First, since the scope of the women’s protection clause is 
strictly defined, little flexibility exists to adjust the standard once new 
needs for women arise. For example, article 76(2) of the Rwandan 
Constitution demands that women fill exactly twenty-four of eighty seats 
on the Chamber of Deputies.121 If women gained political power and 
rightfully won a larger number of seats, article 76(2) could still be used to 
limit them to only twenty-four seats. The explicit nature of clauses like this 
one may serve as a cap to women’s progress. Second, specific standards 
could be dangerous to women if the drafters go too far and draft 
paternalistic clauses. For example, instead of simply guaranteeing special 
protection for mothers in the same way that many constitutions do, article 
47(2) of the Bulgarian Constitution states that “[m]others enjoy special 
 
 120. See Epp, supra note 11, at 767 (“The application of a bill of rights is likely to be influenced . . 
. by the policy preferences of judges.”); see also Andrew D. Heard, The Charter in the Supreme Court 
of Canada: The Importance of Which Judges Hear an Appeal, 24 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 289, 291 (1991) 
(“The potential intrusion of individual judges’ values into their decisions has long been recognized by 
legal commentators.”); id. at 306 (“The lottery-like nature of judicial decisions on the Charter is 
certainly not restricted to the Supreme Court of Canada.”); id. at 307 (“From the Court’s treatment of 
Charter cases, it is clear that the composition of a deciding panel does indeed have a significant bearing 
on the outcome of a Charter case.”). 
 121. CONST. OF THE REP. OF RWANDA art. 76(2), available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search 
using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). Other constitutional clauses that 
set out quotas often guarantee a minimum number of seats, which permits women to hold more 
positions if they win the slots. See, e.g., POST-TRANSITION INTERIM CONST. OF THE REP. OF BURUNDI 
art. 164, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the 
World Online” database) (“The National Assembly is composed of at least hundred (100) deputies . . . 
including a minimum of thirty percent (30%) women . . . .”); PERMANENT CONST. OF THE REP. OF IRAQ 
art. 47(4), available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the 
World Online” database) (“The elections law aims to achieve a percentage of female representatives not 
inferior to one-quarter (1/4) of the members of the Council of Representatives.”). 
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protection of the state which provides them with . . . easier work . . . .”122 
By assuming that pregnant women can only perform “easier work,” the 
Bulgarian Constitution sets forth a paternalistic and limited view on the 
abilities of women. Specific clauses, such as Bulgaria’s, may ultimately 
limit women’s equality if the drafters go too far and draft paternalistic 
clauses. 
However, if constitution-makers have faith in the judiciary, it may be 
preferable to use a women’s protection clause that requires a fair amount of 
judicial interpretation. This format of a women’s protection clause benefits 
from its flexibility, as judges can adjust the legal standards required by the 
clause should new needs for women arise. However, this format is most 
appropriate when the judiciary can be trusted to perform its duties in a way 
that protects women. If constitution-makers fear that the judiciary will 
interpret the clause in a way that fails to protect women, this format is less 
advisable. 
In both Canada and Colombia, drafters formatted the women’s 
protection clauses to require judicial interpretation. This approach seems to 
suit Canada’s needs. In Colombia, where traditions of sex equality are less 
developed, a more specific approach may have been less risky, but 
Colombia still managed to reach satisfactory results in most cases. 
1. Canada 
The drafters of Canada’s amendment selected broad women’s 
protection clauses that require a great deal of interpretation by the courts.123 
For example, section 15 of the Charter guarantees “equal protection and 
equal benefit of law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on . . . sex”124 and does not provide standards for 
determining whether equal protection has been violated.125 This broad 
flexibility is enhanced by section 1 of the Charter, which provides that 
limits on rights can be justified in some circumstances but does not set out 
standards for determining whether rights have been violated.126 The vague 
and general language in the Charter makes it “impossible to ascertain from 
 
 122. CONST. OF THE REP. OF BULG. art. 47(2), available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search 
using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 123. See generally Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, §§ 15, 28 (U.K.); see also Heard, supra note 120, at 293 
(“The broad and ringing phrasing of many rights contained in the Charter gives free rein to judicial 
discretion.”). 
 124. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15 (U.K.). 
 125. See generally id. 
 126. Id. § 1; see also SHARPE & ROACH, supra note 60, at 65. 
LUCAS_CPCXNS.DOC 12/4/2009  2:48:09 PM 
2009] DOES GENDER SPECIFICITY IN CONSTITUTIONS MATTER 153 
the language of the Charter the precise scope and content of its [women’s 
protection clause] guarantees.”127 
Because the Canadian Charter does not provide standards for 
determining whether the constitution has been violated, the Canadian 
Supreme Court established the scope of women’s rights that are protected 
under the Charter. Through litigation, the Court established a two-step 
process for interpreting the women’s protection clauses in the Charter.128 
First, courts look to the “meaning of the right or freedom at issue to 
determine whether the matter complained of constitutes an 
infringement.”129 The Court set out a three-step test in Law v. Canada130 for 
claims brought under section 15,131 which requires proof “on a balance of 
probabilities” of “(1) differential treatment under the law (2) on the basis of 
a ground of discrimination enumerated in section 15(1) or a ground of 
discrimination analogous to those that are enumerated, (3) which 
constitutes discrimination.”132 
Second, courts consider whether the infringement at issue meets the 
section 1 justification of a “reasonable limit[] prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”133 The Court 
established its analysis for this step in R. v. Oakes.134 There, the Court 
considered four aspects: 
1) the objective of the measure must be important enough to warrant 
overriding a Charter right; 
2) there must be a rational connection between the limit on the Charter 
right and the legislative objective; 
3) the limit should impair the Charter right as little as possible; and 
4) there should be an overall balance or proportionality between the 
benefits of the limit and its deleterious effects.135 
 
 127. See Andrew Petter, Canada’s Charter Flight: Soaring Backwards into the Future, 16 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 151, 156 (1989) [hereinafter Petter, Charter Flight]. 
 128. SHARPE & ROACH, supra note 60, at 49-50. 
 129. Id. at 49. 
 130. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.). 
 131. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15 (U.K.). 
 132. SHARPE & ROACH, supra note 60, at 276. 
 133. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 1 (U.K.); SHARPE & ROACH, supra note 60, at 50. 
 134. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.); SHARPE & ROACH, supra note 60, at 65-66. 
 135. SHARPE & ROACH, supra note 60, at 65-66. Courts have used this analysis in many cases. See, 
e.g., Ford v. Quebec (Attorney Gen.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.) (holding that a law that required all 
signs to be in French failed the “minimal impairment” aspect of the Oakes analysis since smaller 
English words could have been included on the signs); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.) 
(using the Oakes analysis to determine that a law that prohibited abortion was not rationally connected 
to the government’s objective of protecting women’s health and the fetus and was not proportional 
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After the analysis, the Court will hold that the Charter prohibits the 
behavior in question if the Court finds that an infringement has occurred 
that is not justified by section 1.136 
Although the Canadian Supreme Court laid out a framework for 
applying the women’s protection clauses, subjectivity still plays a role in 
the judicial analysis.137 Because the current framework requires judges to 
balance rights (particularly with respect to section 1), judges are forced to 
weigh and interpret the rights involved. Therefore, the actual scope of 
rights protected under the women’s protection clauses is affected by the 
subjective interpretation of judges.138 
Ultimately, women have enjoyed strong legal protection under 
Canada’s broad women’s protection clauses,139 but this increased protection 
is almost certainly connected to the Canadian Supreme Court’s generous 
interpretation of women’s rights. The broad and non-specific format of 
women’s protection clauses works well for Canada because the judiciary 
has a history of thoughtfully protecting social values140 and because women 
in Canada are not as oppressed as women in some other countries.141 By 
 
under the Oakes analysis); R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.) (applying the Oakes analysis to hold 
that section 163 of the Criminal Code was justified because limiting pornography furthers the important 
objective of minimizing dangers in society and because the law was proportional); R. v. Keegstra, 
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (using the Oakes analysis, along with section 2(b) of the Charter, to hold 
that a teacher that made anti-Semitic comments to his students was in violation of the Charter). 
 136. SHARPE & ROACH, supra note 60, at 65-74. 
 137. Heard, supra note 120, at 294 (“[C]onsiderable discretion remains to individual judges in 
applying this analysis.”). 
 138. See id. (“Perhaps we need to reflect on the implications of the fact that Canada’s top jurists 
can hear the same arguments and read much the same material relating to a particular Charter claim and 
yet come to opposite conclusions about that claim. One might pause to wonder what this means for the 
supposed ‘inalienability’ of the rights enshrined in the Charter.”); see also id. at 297, 305 (noting that 
“serious discrepancies” exist in judges’ reactions to Charter claims – so much so that “the outcome of a 
Charter claim argued in the Supreme Court of Canada depends to a very large extent upon which judges 
sit on the panel that hears the appeal.”); Andrew Petter, Twenty Years of Charter Justification: From 
Liberal Legalism to Dubious Dialogue, 52 U. N.B. L.J. 187, 191 (2003) (describing a 1990 speech by 
Madam Justice McLachlin where the former Supreme Court justice “spoke of ‘the impossibility of 
avoiding value judgments in Charter decision-making,’ and referred to such value judgments as 
‘essentially arbitrary’”). 
 139. See supra Part III.A. 
 140. See M. David Lepofsky, The Canadian Judicial Approach to Equality Rights: Freedom Ride 
or Roller Coaster?, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 168 (1992) (“The common law in Canada, as in 
England, has often shown itself capable of evolving over time to create new doctrines which 
meaningfully respond to changes in society and social values.”). 
 141. Women have certainly been oppressed in Canada. See Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, 
Women’s Substantive Equality and the Protection of Social and Economic Rights Under the Canadian 
Human Rights Act, in WOMEN AND THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: A COLLECTION OF POLICY 
RESEARCH REPORTS (1999), available at http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/index.php? 
option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=1028. However, the inequality pales in comparison to 
the physical and mental violence against women in other countries like Colombia. See Morgan, 
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selecting a broad format, the drafters of Canada’s amendment gave the 
judiciary the constitutional foothold it needed to embrace a strong program 
of women’s rights while also giving the judiciary the flexibility to react to 
the evolving needs of women. However, clauses like Canada’s permit 
courts to interpret the language in ways that fail to protect women. Thus, 
this format may not sufficiently protect women in countries where the 
judiciary is not as trustworthy. 
2. Colombia 
Like in Canada, the drafters of Colombia’s women’s protection 
clauses chose a broad format that requires judicial interpretation. The 
Colombian women’s protection clauses make broad promises of equal 
treatment without providing for a specific standard for enforcement.142 For 
example, article 13 proclaims that women have a right to be free from 
discrimination in general but does not define standards for what constitutes 
discrimination.143 By drafting broad women’s protection clauses, the 
drafters entrusted the Constitutional Court with the task of setting out 
specific standards for interpretation. 
The Constitutional Court increased the protection of women by 
interpreting the tutela to extend to private rights. Drafters intended the 
Constitution to apply directly to state action and horizontally to private 
actors in some circumstances, but the text of the Constitution does not 
explicitly mandate such a broad application.144 Although lower courts 
initially rejected many women’s claims brought under a tutela, the 
Constitutional Court ultimately held that women are entitled to bring these 
claims, even in the private sphere.145 For example, the Constitutional Court 
 
Machismo, supra note 45, at 259 (discussing the violence in Colombia that served to keep women in a 
position of inequality). 
 142. See Morgan, Machismo, supra note 42, at 256 (noting that the 1991 Constitution is a “broad 
positive rights regime”). While the 1991 Constitution provides guidance with respect to the 
implementation and enforcement of the clauses, it does not specifically define the standard of equality 
applied to women. See, e.g., POLITICAL CONST. OF COLOM. art. 13, available at http:// 
www.oceanalaw.com (search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 143. See POLITICAL CONST. OF COLOM. art. 13, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com (search 
using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database) (“All individuals are born free and 
equal before the law, will receive equal protection and treatment from the authorities, and will enjoy the 
same rights, freedoms, and opportunities without any discrimination on account of gender, race, 
national or family origin, language, religion, political opinion, or philosophy. The State will promote 
the conditions so that equality may be real and effective and will adopt measures in favor of groups that 
are discriminated against or marginalized. The State will especially protect those individuals who on 
account of their economic, physical, or mental condition are in obviously vulnerable circumstances and 
will sanction the abuses or ill-treatment perpetrated against them.”). 
 144. Morgan, Emancipatory Equality, supra note 11, at 80. 
 145. See id. at 81. 
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allowed women to pursue tutela claims against their spouses146 and has also 
allowed tutela actions to extend into the private sphere of education and 
employment.147 
Although the Constitutional Court has used women’s protection 
clauses in many instances to protect women,148 at least one Colombian case 
suggests that the Court sometimes ignores applicable women’s protection 
clauses and issues rulings that detract from gender equality. In Sentencia 
No. C-152/94, the Court looked past article 13’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination and instead upheld a law that required men’s surnames be 
listed prior to women’s surnames on birth registries.149 The Court found 
that the case did not involve equal rights and obligations for women but 
was a “matter . . . of logistics: there had to be an order and the law provided 
one.”150 However, as the dissent argued, “the law was not innocuous but 
reflected a longstanding patriarchal tradition that relegates women to a 
secondary plane.”151 Perhaps if Colombia had adopted a more specific 
clause, the Court would not be justified in bypassing the equality issues.152 
Although this case does not represent a systemic problem in Colombia, this 
case suggests that a more specific format of women’s protection clauses 
may be necessary in some countries. 
Even though the Colombian Constitutional Court has generally 
interpreted Colombia’s women’s protection clauses in a way that facilitates 
 
 146. Id.; see Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia No. T-529/92; 
Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia T-382/94; Corte Constitucional de 
Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia T-487/94; Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional 
Court] Sentencia T-552/94. In deciding to apply the Constitution to these traditionally private spheres, 
the Court “explained the horizontal effects of the fundamental rights involved by pointing out that not 
solely private interests are jeopardized, but fundamental personal rights, likely including those of 
children whose rights are given constitutional priority over those of others.” Morgan, Emancipatory 
Equality, supra note 11, at 81. In reaching its decision to apply horizontal rights, the Court also pointed 
out that the family unit enjoys constitutional protection since it is “recognized as the basis of social 
organization.” Id. 
 147. See Morgan, Emancipatory Equality, supra note 11, at 82. 
 148. See supra Part III.B. 
 149. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia C-152/94; see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 304. 
 150. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia C-152/94; see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 304-05. 
 151. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia C-152/94; see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 304-05. 
 152. Even if the drafters of Colombia’s constitution had chosen a women’s protection clause that 
provided clear standards, it is possible that the Colombian judiciary would still ignore the clauses. 
Although a more specific clause may make a court more likely to comply with the women’s protection 
clauses, a chance always exists that the court will still ignore the clause because the problem may be an 
institutional one rather than one related to the clauses themselves. 
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women’s equality,153 it may have been risky to choose a clause that requires 
judicial interpretation.154 Because of the existing culture of inequality of 
women at the time of the clauses’ adoption155 and the history of a weak 
judiciary,156 a safer choice for Colombia would have been a more specific 
clause that did not require much judicial interpretation. 
B. Consideration No. 2: Should the Clause Be Structured in a Way that 
Excludes Men? 
A second characteristic that constitution-makers should consider is 
whether the scope of the women’s protection clause ought to be open to 
claims by men. In the abstract, neither closing the clauses off to men nor 
opening them to men is preferable as a general rule. Instead, the country’s 
specific situation needs to be considered. If women will be better served by 
allowing men to use the clauses as well (e.g., if the best litigation strategy 
involves the use of men), then the clauses should be open to men. If, 
however, the drafters fear that leaving the clauses open to men will result in 
better treatment for men at the expense of women, the clauses should be 
written in a way that prohibits their use by men. 
Constitution-drafters in both Canada and Colombia structured their 
women’s protection clauses in a way that allows claims to be brought by 
men. In Canada, allowing men to use women’s protection clauses 
ultimately benefited the legal protections of women in Canada, due to a 
readily available social support network and a trustworthy judiciary. 
Despite a culture of gender inequality and distrust in the judiciary, 
Colombia’s women’s protection clauses enjoyed success. However, it may 
have been less risky in Colombia to use a clause that excluded women. 
1. Canada 
Canada’s women’s protection clauses provide legal recourse to men as 
well as women. Instead of limiting claims to women, the clauses guarantee 
rights to “male and female persons.”157 As it turns out, male claimants 
brought seventy percent of the first thirty-five sex discrimination claims 
 
 153. See supra Part III.B. 
 154. See Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 256 (noting that the Colombian judiciary has 
“[l]ong [been] seen as the ‘Cinderella’ among the Colombian governmental branches”). 
 155. See id. at 259-60 (discussing the violence in Colombia that served to keep women in a position 
of inequality). 
 156. See id. at 256. 
 157. See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 28 (U.K.). 
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brought under the Charter.158 Although in the abstract it may appear 
detrimental to women’s legal protection to allow men to take advantage of 
the clauses, LEAF, the Canadian feminist legal strategy group, used male 
cases as part of a litigation strategy designed to protect women.159 
In Shewchuk v. Ricard, a man claimed a violation of section 15 
(“every individual [should be treated as] equal before and under the law . . . 
without discrimination based on . . . sex”)160 based on a law that treated 
fathers of illegitimate children differently than mothers of the children.161 
LEAF intervened, but instead of attacking the formal equality argument as 
an inadequate interpretation of the women’s protection clause, the feminist 
group embraced the more limited formal view of equality.162 The attorneys 
representing LEAF felt that “it would weaken their credibility to argue that 
sexual equality rights should not be available to males.”163 
LEAF also used cases with male plaintiffs as a strategy to develop 
constitutional interpretations that could be used in later cases to further 
women’s equality. For example, LEAF intervened in Andrews v. Law 
Society of British Columbia164 in attempt to expand the Court’s 
interpretation of section 15 for future claims.165 This case centered on a 
male plaintiff who claimed that his Charter rights were violated by a 
Canadian citizenship requirement.166 LEAF used this case to successfully 
“urge[] the Court to narrow eligibility for section 15 protection to 
‘historically disadvantaged groups’; to broaden its scope to include 
discriminatory effect as well as discriminatory purpose; and to shift the 
burden of proof to the government by deferring the issue of 
 
 158. Andrew Petter, Legitimizing Sexual Inequality: Three Early Charter Cases, 34 MCGILL L.J. 
358, 360-61 (1988) [hereinafter Petter, Legitimizing Sexual Inequality]. In some of these cases, men 
attempted to use the women’s protection clauses to chip away at women’s freedoms, such as by 
attempting to limit women’s abortion rights. See, e.g., Minister of Justice of Can. v. Borowski, [1981] 2 
S.C.R. 575 (Can.) (holding that men do not have standing in abortion suits); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 
S.C.R. 30 (Can.) (striking a law that prohibited abortions outside of hospitals). 
 159. Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 64-67 (discussing LEAF’s litigation strategy of using “test 
cases” and listing several LEAF cases with male plaintiffs). 
 160. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15 (U.K.). 
 161. [1986] 28 D.L.R. (4th) 429 (Can.); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15(1) (U.K.); see also Petter, 
Legitimizing Sexual Inequality, supra note 158, at 362. 
 162. Petter, Legitimizing Sexual Inequality, supra note 158, at 362 (“[T]he LEAF factum voiced 
unqualified support for the view that all sexual distinctions in legislation should be treated alike . . . .”). 
 163. Id. at 362-63. 
 164. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.). 
 165. Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 64. 
 166. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.). 
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‘reasonableness’ to the second stage (proportionality) of the section 1 
test.”167 
LEAF also successfully used this strategy in R. v. Keegstra,168 a case 
that ultimately played a crucial role in a later pornography censorship 
victory by LEAF.169 In this case, an anti-Semite complained that his 
Charter rights were violated by a hate speech provision of Canadian law.170 
In its intervention, LEAF “defend[ed] the law as a ‘reasonable limitation’ 
of freedom of speech (section 1) on the grounds that it served the ‘pressing 
and substantial purpose’ of protecting the same ‘historically disadvantaged 
minorities’ protected by section 15 (in the matter of Andrews).”171 The 
Supreme Court accepted LEAF’s argument, and LEAF later used this 
decision as “the foundation” for its successful arguments in the later 
pornography censorship case.172 As LEAF’s strategy in these cases 
demonstrates, women’s groups in Canada took advantage of male cases to 
gain credibility in their own quest for women’s legal equality.173 
2. Colombia 
As in Canada, the designers of the Colombian constitution formatted 
many of the women’s protection clauses in language that applies to both 
men and women.174 For example, article 13 states that “all individuals are 
born free and equal before the law, will receive equal protection and 
treatment from the authorities, and will enjoy the same rights, freedoms, 
and opportunities without any discrimination on account of gender . . . .”175 
 
 167. Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 65 & n.24. 
 168. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
 169. Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 66. 
 170. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.); see also Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 66. 
 171. Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 66. 
 172. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.); Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 66. The pornography case is 
Butler. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.). In Butler, LEAF argued successfully “that pornography is a form of 
‘hate speech’ targeted at a different section 15 ‘minority’: women.” Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 
66. 
 173. Women’s legal rights in the United States have also been furthered by a litigation regime that 
includes equal protection cases brought by men. Although the United States’ Constitution does not 
include a women’s protection clause, see U.S. CONST., the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal 
Rights Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as protective of women’s rights. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 208-09 (1976). Led by Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the U.S. Supreme Court 
followed a litigation strategy that allowed both men and women to take advantage of promises of equal 
protection. See Deborah Jones Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of 
Opportunity and Equality, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 39, 47 (2004). Ginsburg conceived of a strategy based 
on the notion that women should be treated equally with men and that, if women were treated favorably 
without proper justification, then the quest for true equality could not be achieved. Id. at 43. 
 174. See, e.g., POLITICAL CONST. OF COLOM. art. 13, available at http://www.oceanalaw.com 
(search using “Constitutions of the Countries of the World Online” database). 
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Colombia illustrates a set of circumstances in which it may have been 
appropriate to exclude men from taking advantage of the women’s 
protection clauses. These circumstances included a distrust for the judiciary 
and a cultural norm of gender inequality.176 Because of the presence of 
these two factors, there was a strong risk in Colombia that men would 
attempt to take advantage of the clauses to the detriment of women. 
In fact, in at least one case, Sentencia C-410/94, men have used 
Colombia’s women’s protection clauses in an attempt to limit the 
protection women experience under the clause.177 In that case, a man 
challenged a retirement law that favored women under article 13.178 Despite 
the risks mentioned above, the Court upheld the law as reasonably designed 
to compensate women for past discrimination.179 
This case demonstrates that, notwithstanding these attacks and the 
historical weakness of the judiciary, the Colombian judiciary managed to 
enforce the clauses, for the most part, to protect women.180 Thus, even 
when a country may be better suited for a narrow format, the country may 
still succeed with a broad clause. I suggest that constitution-drafters should 
carefully consider whether they ought to take on this risk. 
C. Consideration No. 3: Does the Structure of the Clause Force Litigants to 
Make Arguments that Restrict Women’s Rights? 
Finally, constitution-drafters should consider the arguments promoted 
by the structure of the clause in conjunction with the rest of the 
constitution. The structure may encourage arguments that favor formal 
equality, which views men and women as similarly situated individuals that 
should have equal access to the same legal mechanisms.181 The structure 
may alternatively encourage arguments that favor substantive equality, 
which emphasizes gender equality in the actual outcomes and results of 
judicial decisions.182 I do not seek to identify which theory of rights best 
protects women.183 Instead, I simply note the importance of drafting the 
 
 176. See Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 256, 259. 
 177. See Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia C-410/94; Morgan, 
Machismo, supra note 45, at 256. 
 178. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia C-410/94, see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 306. 
 179. Corte Constitucional de Colombia [Constitutional Court] Sentencia C-410/94, see also 
Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 306. 
 180. See supra Part III.B. 
 181. See Goonesekere, supra note 42, at 9-10. 
 182. See id. 
 183. I have already acknowledged my bias toward a substantive view of equality. See supra Part 
I.C. 
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women’s protection clause carefully so that the theory of rights chosen is 
properly supported by the structure of the clause and the rest of the 
constitution. 
There are two relevant inquiries in determining whether the structure 
of the clause forces litigants to make particular types of arguments: the 
format of the clause itself and the format of the clause in conjunction with 
the constitution as a whole. First, drafters should consider what types of 
arguments are promoted by the structure of the women’s protection clause 
itself. For example, one way to promote a substantive theory of equality is 
through the use of a women’s protection clause that specifically allows for 
affirmative action, or even mandates it.184 Article 15(2) of the Canadian 
Charter illustrates such an allowance approach. It provides that 
“[s]ubsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as 
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.”185 
By explicitly allowing affirmative action, the Canadian Charter embraces a 
substantive view of equality. 
Second, drafters need to consider how the women’s protection clauses 
interact with the constitution as a whole. This inquiry is important because 
the arguments promoted by women’s protection clauses may be overcome 
by other structural tendencies within the constitution. For instance, even 
though Canada adopted an affirmative-action women’s protection clause, 
some scholars argue that the structure of the Charter forces more restrictive 
arguments.186 Richard Petter, for example, argues that the “powerful and 
pervasive” nature of the Charter favors formal, rather than substantive, 
equality arguments and that feminist litigants are sometimes forced “to play 
the Charter game on its own terms—even if doing so legitimizes a view of 
equality that disregards women’s real social disadvantage and supports the 
ability of men to claim an even greater share of scarce social resources.”187 
 
 184. See Goonesekere, supra note 42, at 10 (noting that affirmative action fits within a substantive 
view of equality). 
 185. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. 
B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15(2) (U.K.). 
 186. See, e.g., Petter, Legitimizing Sexual Inequality, supra note 158, at 361, 363. 
 187. Id. (noting that formal equality arguments have enjoyed the most success in the Court). This 
tendency to accept formal equality arguments over substantive equality arguments may in part be due to 
the section 1 limitation, which notes that all Charter rights are “subject to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” See Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched. B to the Canada Act 
1982, ch. 11, § 1 (U.K). 
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As an example, Petter offers Shewchuk v. Ricard.188 There, a man sued 
based on a law that treated fathers of illegitimate children differently than 
mothers,189 and LEAF intervened and argued in favor of formal equality as 
an adequate interpretation of section 15.190 The Court struck down the law, 
thus accepting the formal equality interpretation.191 As Petter argues, this 
case suggests that, despite the affirmative action women’s protection 
clause, the structure of the Charter may sometimes be so pervasive that it 
can force litigants to argue for moderate or conservative views of women’s 
equality.192 
As demonstrated by Canada, drafters can use the structure of women’s 
protection clauses as a good first step in indicating which notion of equality 
constitution-drafters wish to be embraced under a new constitution or 
constitutional amendment, but constitution-makers also need to consider 
how the women’s protection clauses interact with the rest of the 
constitution’s structure to ensure that their chosen theory of equality can be 
promoted using the constitution. 
V. LESSON NO. 3: WOMEN’S PROTECTION CLAUSES ALONE ARE 
INSUFFICIENT TO SECURE WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
The third lesson evident from the case studies is that women’s 
protection clauses alone may be insufficient to bring about complete legal 
equality for women. As Dr. Ninon Colneric discovered after an analysis of 
the new gender rights guarantees in Germany in the mid-1990s, “if we are 
going to bring about true equality between men and women, it is not 
enough to simply create equal rights for men and women. A more active 
approach is needed.”193 An examination of Canada and Colombia reveals 
that an active approach was taken to achieve gender equality success; as 
discussed in Part III.B.2, multiple factors may have played a role in the 
success of the women’s protection clauses.194 The case studies indicate that 
 
 188. Shewchuk v. Ricard, [1986] 28 D.L.R. (4th) 429 (Can.); Petter, Legitimizing Sexual 
Inequality, supra note 158, at 363. 
 189. 28 D.L.R. (4th) at 433. 
 190. See Petter, Legitimizing Sexual Inequality, supra note 158, at 362 (“[T]he LEAF factum 
voiced unqualified support for the view that all sexual distinctions in legislation should be treated alike . 
. . .”). 
 191. Schewchuk v. Ricard, 28 D.L.R. (4th) at 450. 
 192. This is not to say that conservative or moderate views on feminism cannot protect women 
adequately. Instead, I suggest that the structure of the Charter forces litigants to argue for this view even 
if they believe a different equality theory should apply. 
 193. Ninon Colneric, Making Equality Law More Effective: Lessons from the German Experience, 
3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 249 (1996). 
 194. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the possible role of the tutela in the success of the women’s 
protection clauses in Colombia). 
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women’s protection clauses may be affected by enforcement mechanisms, 
active feminist litigation groups, enabling legislation, and efforts to 
improve access to courts. 
First, enforcement mechanisms almost undoubtedly played a role in 
the success of the women’s protection clauses in Colombia. In contrast to 
previous constitutions, the 1991 Colombian Constitution created a 
Constitutional Court and the tutela, which empowered individuals to bring 
suits when their constitutional rights have been abridged.195 Litigants have 
used the new women’s protection clauses with success in many cases,196 
but their success is due also to the enforcement mechanisms that allow 
litigants to even bring suits. Without the tutela and the new Constitutional 
Court, the women’s protection clauses may have been meaningless. 
Second, an active feminist organization, LEAF, was crucial to the 
success of the clauses in Canada.197 LEAF organized a litigation campaign 
that strategically developed the jurisprudence with respect to the women’s 
protection clauses to take full advantage of the protections within the 
women’s protection clauses.198 Without the involvement of LEAF and 
other similar litigation support organizations, the women’s protection 
clauses in Canada may not have been utilized as effectively in securing 
women’s rights. 
Third, enabling legislation may play a crucial role in securing legal 
equality. The culture of violence against women in Colombia acted as a 
impediment to achieving the equality guaranteed in the Colombian 
Constitution.199 In an effort to comply with the constitutional mandate to 
eliminate family violence, Colombia enacted La Ley de Violencia 
Intrafamiliar in 1996, which penalized family abusers with a one- to two-
year prison sentence.200 Since a crucial element in achieving gender 
equality in Colombia was to eliminate violence against women,201 the 
efforts for achieving women’s equality likely benefited from this 
 
 195. See supra Part II.B. 
 196. See supra Part II.B. 
 197. Epp, supra note 11, at 776. 
 198. See Morton & Allen, supra note 10, at 56. 
 199. See Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 259-60 (discussing the violence in Colombia that 
served to keep women in a position of inequality). 
 200. C. PROC. CIV. art. 294/96 (1996) (Colom.); Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 283. The 
constitutional mandate to eliminate family violence is contained in article 42, which states in part that 
“[a]ny form of violence in the family is considered destructive of its harmony and unity, and will be 
sanctioned according to law.” POLITICAL CONST. OF COLOM. art. 42. 
 201. Morgan, Machismo, supra note 45, at 259-60 (discussing the violence in Colombia that served 
to keep women in a position of inequality). 
LUCAS_CPCXNS.DOC 12/4/2009  2:48:09 PM 
164 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 20:133 
legislation. Other similar legislation may be a factor in the success of 
women’s protection clauses.202 
Finally, endeavors to achieve gender equality need to be supported by 
efforts to improve true access to courts for non-privileged parties. For 
example, scholars argue that Canadian gender equality may be limited to 
privileged women.203 Because remedies are tied to the “availab[ility] of 
education, wealth, information, time and a sense of political efficacy,”204 
not all Canadian women have access to the benefits secured by Canada’s 
women’s protection clauses.205 The costs of litigation in Canada are often 
so high that low- and middle-income Canadians cannot afford to pursue 
their Charter rights.206 As Canada’s example demonstrates, successful 
endeavors at achieving gender equality may need to include efforts at 
ensuring that non-privileged parties have access to courts. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the practical legal effects of the women’s 
protection clauses in Canada and Colombia reveals three important lessons 
for constitution-drafters. Although no absolute answers exist as to the 
appropriate structure of women’s protection clauses, drafters should 
carefully select a format that best serves the needs of the country. In 
particular, drafters ought to consider whether the clause depends upon 
judicial interpretation, whether the clause allows men to make use of the 
clause, and whether the structure of the clause forces litigants to make 
arguments that restrict women’s rights. Relevant considerations in making 
these decisions include the country’s background and the drafters’ own 
goals in including the clauses. By carefully considering the format of the 
women’s protection clauses, drafters can ensure that women’s protection 
clauses continue to make a positive impact on women’s equality (or at a 
minimum, ensure that the clauses do not make a negative impact). 
However, even after drafters carefully tailor women’s protection clauses 
for their country, the clauses probably will not be enough to protect gender 
 
 202. For example, Poland’s inability to achieve gender equality through its 1997 Polish 
Constitution may have been due to the absence of enabling legislation. Waylen, supra note 16, at 216. 
Poland, which transitioned from state socialism to democracy during the third-wave of democracy, 
incorporated a women’s protection clause that guaranteed the equality of men and women. Id. Despite 
the women’s protection clause, Poland struggled to achieve equality because no legislation or civil 
codes existed to support the clause. Id. 
 203. See Joyce Green, Balancing Strategies: Aboriginal Women and Constitutional Rights in 
Canada, in DOBROWOLSKY & HART, supra note 3, at 37, 43. 
 204. Id. at 43. 
 205. See id. at 39. 
 206. See Petter, Charter Flight, supra note 127, at 156. 
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equality on their own. Women’s protection clauses are one, but only one, 
important component of what needs to be a multi-faceted approach toward 
achieving gender equality. 
 
